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Abstract
The Court of Justice of the EU has set aside a group of General
Court judgments and annulled a set of information request decisions by the European
Commission. The requests for information, adopted in the form of decisions in the
context of a competition infringement investigation, were comprehensive but accom-
panied by notably vague and concise statements of reasons. The Court of Justice of
the EU has found that the General Court erred in law when finding the information
request decisions adequately reasoned. The judgments entail important clarifications
of the duty to state reasons in the specific context of competition investigations.
1 Introduction
Article 296 TFEU and case law interpreting that provision
require that measures adopted by EU institutions must be appropriate to the
measure at issue and must disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasoning
followed by the institution which adopted the measure. It must be possible for
the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable
a competent court to review its legality.1 The requirements to be satisfied by a
statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case. Whether a
statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be
assessed with regard not only to the wording of the statement but also to its
context and to the legal rules governing the matter in question.2
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Under Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003,3 the European Commission (‘Com-
mission’), in order to carry out its duties in terms of investigating and finding
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, may, either by a simple request or
by a decision, ‘require undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide
all necessary information’ (Art. 18(1)). According to Article 18(3), when requesting
information by a decision, the Commission should ‘state the legal basis and
the purpose of the request, specify what information is required’ and set a time
limit for providing the information.4 Additionally, the Commission must indicate
penalties – potentially significant fines or periodic penalty payments – relevant
in the case of failure to react to an information request decision. Furthermore,
the Commission must indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the
EU Courts.
The possibility to issue information requests is essential for the Commission
to be able to investigate suspected competition law infringements. A compre-
hensive fact-finding phase may precede the formal opening of proceedings
against an undertaking. Discovering concealed illicit practices that are detri-
mental to society is both challenging and important. Information requests and
other powerful tools for gathering information, such as inspections (also known
as ‘dawn raids’), should nevertheless be used wisely, balancing different in-
terests. Complying with information requests or undergoing inspections may
be significantly time and resource consuming for the undertakings involved
(and thus, furthermore, negatively affect overall welfare). Moreover, fact-finding
exercises should not infringe general principles of EU law or fundamental
rights.5 As the cases discussed in this article also illustrate, the Commission
must not undertake comprehensive ‘fishing expeditions’ or issue almost random
information requests, especially later in an investigation.
Article 296 TFEU with the case law interpreting the provision and the spe-
cific requirements of Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003 together form the relevant
EU law as regards the appropriateness of the statement of reasons in an infor-
Council Regulation No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1.
3
Recital 23 of Regulation 1/2003 states that the Commission should be empowered to require
‘such information to be supplied as is necessary to detect’ an infringement of competition
4
rules. The Recital clarifies that undertakings cannot be forced to admit that they have committed
an infringement, but they are obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents.
See further, e.g., M. Kellerbauer/R. Sauer/C. Hödlmayr/L. Ortiz Blanco/K. Jörgens, ‘Investiga-
tion of Cases (II): Formal Investigative Measures in General, Requests for Information, and
5
Interviews’, in L. Ortiz Blanco (ed.), EU Competition Procedure (Oxford: OUP, 3rd edn., 2013),
277-313, 277-282, 290-309; C.S. Kerse/N. Khan, EC Antitrust Procedure (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 5th edn., 2005), 38-40, 125-143; M. Prek/S. Lefe ̀vre, ‘Competition Litigation before
the General Court: Quality If Not Quantity?’, CMLR [2016], 65-90, 82-89; P. Craig, EU Admin-
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mation request decision. The adequacy of such statements of reasons lies at
the core of four judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) issued
on 10 March 2016, the ‘Cement Judgments’. The CJEU set aside a group of
General Court (‘GC’) judgments, which had found the statements of reasons
adequate, and annulled the corresponding Commission information request
decisions. The four CJEU judgments are essentially alike.6
The Cement Judgments underline that the earlier steps in an investigation
affect the requirements as regards indicating the purpose of an information
request and suspected infringements. Potential infringements may not be re-
ferred to in an excessively vague manner if, from an objective perspective, the
Commission could present more detailed descriptions.
As regards competition infringement investigations and procedures relevant
in the Cement case, the case was closed without finding an infringement in
2015. Nevertheless, some of the appeals concerning the lawfulness of the
Commission’s information requests remained pending, resulting in the four
judgments by the CJEU.
2 Facts and Background
The competition investigations which form the background
to the Cement Judgments concerned several cement companies in the EU area.
In November 2008 and September 2009, the Commission carried out inspec-
tions at the premises of many undertakings and, on 6 December 2010, initiated
formal proceedings for alleged competition infringements against several cement
companies. The Commission described the suspected infringements in highly
general terms.7 On 30 March 2011, when the Commission issued information
requests, in the form of decisions, requiring the undertakings concerned to
answer a questionnaire that related to suspected infringements, the suspicions
were still written out vaguely.8
See Cases C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149; C-248/14 P Schwenk
Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150; C-267/14 P Buzzi Unicem v. Commission EU:C:2016:151;
C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v. Commission EU:C:2016:152.
6
See further Cases C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement AG v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 4;7
C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, para. 4; C-267/14 P Buzzi Unicem
v. Commission EU:C:2016:151, para. 4; C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v. Commission EU:C:2016:152,
para. 4. See also CJEU Press Release 27/16 ‘The Court of Justice annuls the Commission de-
cisions relating to requests for information directed at cement manufacturers’, Luxembourg
(10 March 2016).
Commission Decisions C (2011) 2356 final, C (2011) 2361 final, C (2011) 2364 final and C (2011)
2367 final of 30 March 2011 relating to a proceeding under Article 18(3) of Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1/2003, Case COMP/39520 – Cement and related products.
8
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Among several companies, HeidelbergCement AG (‘HeidelbergCement’),
Schwenk Zement KG, Buzzi Unicem SpA, and Italmobiliare SpA (‘the Appel-
lants’), brought actions for annulment before the GC. They argued, among
other issues, that the Commission had failed to adequately describe the alleged
competition infringements and that the information requests were dispropor-
tionately burdensome. The GC essentially dismissed the actions, noting that
the information request decisions had been lawful.9 The GC found only a minor
issue regarding which the claims of one Appellant should be upheld.10
The Appellants brought the case to the CJEU in order to set aside the GC
judgments and annul the Commission information request decisions. In their
appeals, they argued, in particular, that the GC had erred in law when it found
the statements of reasons by the Commission to be adequate, and, for example,
that the GC had erroneously evaluated the necessity for the information reques-
ted, that the GC erred in law when it considered that the Commission was en-
titled to request information in a specific format, and that the GC wrongly in-
terpreted the right not to incriminate oneself.11
3 Reasoning of the Court
The CJEU started its analysis by evaluating the grounds of
appeal relating to the GC’s error of law when it reviewed compliance with the
requirements for Commission decisions under Article 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003
and the duty to state reasons. In particular, this issue was about indicating the
aim of the information requests.12 The GC had found the Appellants’ arguments
alleging failure to state sufficient reasons unfounded.13 The Appellants argued,
See Cases T-302/11 HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:T:2014:128; T-306/11 Schwenk Zement
v. Commission EU:T:2014:123; T-297/11 Buzzi Unicem v. Commission EU:T:2014:122; T-305/11
Italmobiliare v. Commission EU:T:2014:126.
9
The GC found, regarding Schwenk Zement KG, that the time limit for answering certain
questions was disproportionate and insufficient. See Case T-306/11 Schwenk Zement v. Commis-
sion EU:T:2014:123.
10
See further Opinion by Advocate General (‘AG’) Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v.
Commission EU:C:2015:694; Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v.
11
Commission EU:C:2015:695; Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-267/14 P Buzzi Unicem v. Commis-
sion EU:C:2015:696; Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v. Commission
EU:C:2015:697.
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 11. See also
paras. 10, 12-15. See further, e.g., Case C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150,
paras. 11-16.
12
See note 9 supra.13
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furthermore, that even the GC’s judgments on this issue were insufficiently
reasoned.14
The Commission emphasised that the requirement to state reasons must
be adapted to the circumstances of the case and that information requests are
investigative measures generally used in the preliminary fact-finding stage. The
fact that the Commission at that stage does not have detailed information at its
disposal should signify that it is not necessary to describe in detail the nature,
geographical scope and duration of the suspected infringement, or the products
concerned by it, in order to comply with Article 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003 and
EU law. Furthermore, the Commission highlighted that information request
decisions and decisions to initiate formal proceedings contained specific infor-
mation on the alleged infringement and participants in it. Hence, the informa-
tion request decisions, read in conjunction with the decisions to initiate pro-
ceedings, included sufficient guidance as regards the purpose of the request
for information, and the GC correctly, and without infringing its own obligation
to state reasons, found the requests for information lawful.15
The CJEU noted, as a starting point, that the issue whether the GC had erred
in law in dismissing the plea concerning inadequate statement of reasons was
a question of law and subject to review by the CJEU on appeal.16 The CJEU
continued by recalling settled case law on the duty to state reasons under Article
296 TFEU, highlighting that it is not necessary that the reasoning includes all
the relevant facts and points of law because the issue whether a statement of
reasons complies with Article 296 TFEU must be assessed taking into account,
in addition to its wording, the context and all the legal rules governing the
matter in question.17
Additionally, the CJEU noted that Article 18(3) of Regulation 1/2003 defines
the essential elements of a statement of reasons for an information request
decision.18 It underlined that the obligation to state specific reasons set out in
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 12. See also
Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2015:695, paras.
41-44.
14
See Cases C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 13-14; C-248/14
P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, paras. 13-15; C-267/14 P Buzzi Unicem v.
15
Commission EU:C:2016:151, paras. 14-15; C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v. Commission EU:C:2016:152,
paras. 15-16.
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 15.16
See, e.g., ibid., para. 16; Case C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, para.
20. See also Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030, paras. 31-33;
Case C-367/95 P Commission v. Sytraval and Brink’s France EU:C:1998:154, para. 63.
17
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 17-18; Case
C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, paras. 21-22.
18
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the provision is a fundamental requirement the purpose of which is not only
to show that the request is justified but also to enable the undertakings con-
cerned to evaluate the scope of their duty to cooperate and to safeguard compa-
nies’ rights of defence. The CJEU referred here to case law on another type of
information gathering decisions, that is, inspection decisions, noting that cases
were relevant by analogy.19
Regarding the obligation to state the ‘purpose of the request’ (Art. 18(3) of
Regulation 1/2003), the CJEU explained that this relates to the obligation to
indicate the subject of the Commission’s investigation and thus to the duty to
identify the alleged competition infringement.20 It is not required that the
Commission communicates to the addressees of an information request decision
all the information at its disposal concerning suspected infringements, or
conducts a precise legal analysis of those infringements, provided that it ‘clearly
indicates the suspicions which it intends to investigate’.21
The CJEU noted that this obligation may be explained, among other issues,
by the fact that Article 18(1) and Recital 23 of Regulation 1/2003 allow the
Commission to require submission of ‘all necessary information’– which signi-
fies that the Commission may require disclosure only of information which
may enable it to investigate presumed infringements. According to the CJEU,
the GC had correctly noted this issue, for instance, concerning the action by
HeidelbergCement.22
The CJEU underlined that because the necessity for information must be
assessed in relation to the purpose stated in the request, that purpose must be
indicated with sufficient precision. Failure to do so would both make it im-
possible to determine whether the information is necessary and prevent the
exercise of any judicial review.23 Thus – as the GC had for instance also held in
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 19; Case19
C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, para. 23. The cases cited were Joined
Cases 97/87 to 99/87 Dow Chemical EU:C:1989:380; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères
EU:C:2002:603; Case C-583/13 PDeutsche Bahn andOthers v. Commission EU:C:2015:404; Case
C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030.
See e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 20. See also
Case C-36/92 P SEP NV v. Commission EU:C:1994:205, para 21; Opinion by AG Jacobs in Case
C-36/92 P SEP NV v. Commission EU:C:1993:928, paras. 22-34.
20
See e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 21. Case21
C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030, para. 35 and case law cited there
was again referred to as being relevant by analogy.
See e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 22-23. See
also, e.g., Case T-302/11 HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:T:2014:128, para. 34.
22
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 24; Case23
C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, para. 28. See also Case C-36/92 P
SEP NV v. Commission EU:C:1994:205, para 21; Opinion by AG Jacobs in Case C-36/92 P SEP
NV v. Commission EU:C:1993:928, in particular, para. 34.
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the case of HeidelbergCement’s action – the adequacy of the statements of
reasons here depended on whether the infringements that the Commission
intended to investigate were defined sufficiently clearly.24
Proceeding to evaluate whether the GC had erred in law when it found that
the statements of reasons of the Commission decisions were adequate, the
CJEU noted that the GC had remarked that the statements of reasons were
formulated in very general terms but that the ‘reference to restrictions on im-
ports in the European Economic Area (EEA), to market-sharing and to price
coordination in the cement market and related product markets, read in con-
junction with the decision to initiate proceedings’ had the minimum degree of
clarity necessary to find that the requirements of Article 18(3) of Regulation
1/2003 had been met.25
The CJEU highlighted that the Commission had asked the Appellants to
answer a questionnaire annexed to each decision. The matters referred to in
the annex were notably numerous and covered different types of information.
In particular, the questionnaire required disclosure of extensive and detailed
information relating to a significant number of both domestic and international
transactions, in relation to twelve Member States over a period of ten years.26
Nevertheless, the decisions did not clearly and unequivocally disclose suspicions
of infringement and did not enable a determination whether the information
requested was necessary for the investigation. The information request decisions
only contained excessively brief statements of reasons which were vague, espe-
cially when observed in the light of the length of the annexed questionnaire
and the fact that the requests were presented in a situation where submission
of information had already taken place throughout the investigation.27
See e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 25; Case24
T-302/11 HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:T:2014:128, para. 39.
See Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 26; Case T-302/11
HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:T:2014:128, paras. 42-43. See also similarly, e.g., Case
25
C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, para. 30; Case T-306/11 Schwenk
Zement v. Commission EU:T:2014:123, paras. 37-38.
See Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 27. See also similarly
Case C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, paras. 31-32; Case C-267/14 P
26
Buzzi Unicem v. Commission EU:C: 2016:151, paras. 28-29; Case C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v.
Commission EU:C:2016:152, paras. 29-30. See further Commission Decisions C (2011) 2356 final,
C (2011) 2361 final, C (2011) 2364 final and C (2011) 2367 final of 30 March 2011 relating to a
proceeding under Article 18(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, Case COMP/39520 –
Cement and related products.
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 27-31; Case
C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, paras. 31-34; Commission Decisions
27
C (2011) 2361 final and C (2011) 2367 final of 30 March 2011 relating to a proceeding under Ar-
ticle 18(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, Case COMP/39520 – Cement and related
products. The information request decisions themselves noted the fact that information had
already been submitted earlier.
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For example, in the decision addressed to HeidelbergCement, the two Recit-
als that contained the statement of reasons read:
‘1. The Commission is currently investigating alleged anti-competitive con-
duct in the cement, cement products and other materials used in the production
of cement and of cement-based products industries ... in the European Union
/ European Economic Area (EU/EEA).
2. … The alleged infringements relate to restrictions on trade in the European
Economic Area (EEA), in particular restrictions on imports into the EEA from
countries outside of the EEA, market-sharing and price-coordination practices
as well as other anti-competitive practices relating thereto in the cement and
related products markets. If their existence were to be confirmed, those acts
could constitute an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and/or Article 53 of the
EEA Agreement.’28
The CJEU found that the statements of reasons were inadequate.29
It proceeded to note that it is true that the issue whether a statement of
reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be evaluated by also
taking into account the context in which the relevant decision was taken, and
that in this case, the context included decisions to initiate proceedings. Never-
theless, even the statements of reasons for those decisions could not be seen
as offsetting the faults of the statements of reasons in the information request
decisions.30 The decisions to initiate proceedings contained vague expressions
of possible infringement. For example, in the decision addressed to Heidelberg-
Cement, it was referred to ‘restrictions of trade flows in the European Economic
Area (EEA) including restrictions on imports into the EEA from countries out-
side the EEA, market allocations, price coordination and related anti-competitive
practices’.31 The CJEU underlined that, in the decisions to initiate proceedings,
the products which the investigation concerned were also described in general
terms, referring to cement markets and related product markets but mentioning
See Commission Decision C (2011) 2361 final of 30 March 2011 relating to a proceeding under
Article 18(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, Case COMP/39520 – Cement and related
products; Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 29.
28
See Cases C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 31; C-248/14 P
Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, para. 35; C-267/14 PBuzzi Unicem v. Commission
EU:C:2016:151, para. 32; C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v. Commission EU:C:2016:152, para. 33.
29
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 32-33; Case
C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, paras. 36-38.
30
See Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 34. See also Com-
mission Press Release IP/10/1696 ‘Antitrust: Commission opens antitrust proceedings against
a number of cement manufacturers’, Brussels, 10 December 2010.
31
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more specific products only by way of example. Furthermore, as regards the
geographical scope of the alleged infringement, the decisions contained non-
exhaustive lists of several Member States.32
The CJEU moved on to note that it is true that a request for information is
an investigative measure generally used at the investigation stage, before a
formal statement of objections.33 Regarding inspection decisions the CJEU has
held that even though the Commission is under an obligation to indicate what
is sought and to what matters the inspection relates, the fact that inspections
are carried out at the beginning of an investigation signifies that the Commission
need not, for instance, precisely define the relevant market or explain the exact
legal nature of presumed infringements.34
In the Cement case, the requests for information were issued more than
two years after the first inspections, there had been earlier information requests,
and at the time of adopting the information request decisions the Commission
had information which would have allowed a more precise description of sus-
picions of infringement. The CJEU concluded that excessively vague – and
partially ambiguous – statements of reasons could not fulfil the requirements
relating to the obligation to state reasons in such a situation.35
Thus, the GC was considered to have erred in law when it found that the
information request decisions at issue contained adequate statements of reasons.
The heads of complaint relating to this issue were upheld for all Appellants,
while other heads of complaint, including the GC’s alleged failures to state
sufficient reasons, were not examined. The CJEU set aside the relevant GC
judgments and annulled the corresponding Commission information request
decisions.36
See e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 35-36. See
also, e.g., Case C-248/14 P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, paras. 36-40.
32
See e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para 37. See also
Case 374/87 Orkem EU:C:1989:387, paras. 20-24.
33
See Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030, paras. 35-37. See also,
e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 38.
34
See Cases C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 39; C-248/14 P
Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, para. 43; C-267/14 PBuzzi Unicem v. Commission
EU:C:2016:151, para. 40; C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v. Commission EU:C:2016:152, para. 41.
35
See Cases C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU: C: 2016:149, paras. 39-47; C-248/14
P Schwenk Zement v. Commission EU:C:2016:150, paras. 44-51; C-267/14 P Buzzi Unicem v.
36
Commission EU:C:2016:151, paras. 41-48; C-268/14 P Italmobiliare v. Commission EU:C:2016:152,
paras. 42-49.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Preliminary Remarks on the Significance of the Cement
Case
Commission competition investigations and the position, or
procedural rights, of undertakings have been topical in recent CJEU cases, es-
pecially in the context of the early stages of investigations and fact-finding.37
The Cement Judgments elaborate on requirements for a statement of reasons
in the context of Commission information request decisions under Article 18
of Regulation 1/2003. The clarifications may be relevant for other competition
investigation fact-finding decisions as well.
Even though the Court focused only on the duty to state reasons (out of the
several potential problems put forward by the Appellants), it is noteworthy that
the AG Opinions in the Cement case highlight several interesting matters in
terms of the relevant type of Commission decision and judicial review. AG
Wahl found several of the Appellants’ pleas convincing, and, for instance, in
the Opinion regarding the action by HeidelbergCement, concluded that five
out of seven grounds of appeal should be upheld.38
4.2 Thorough AG Opinions
The comprehensive AG Opinions may be interesting for un-
dertakings assessing whether to question a fact-finding related Commission
decision or its review by the GC.
For instance, and importantly, the AG highlighted that the GC seemed to
have evaluated the issue of ‘necessary information’ erroneously, applying an
incorrect test of necessity. For example HeidelbergCement argued in its appeal
that the GC had applied an erroneous interpretation of necessity of information
under Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003.39 AG Wahl underlined that ‘A decision
See, in particular, Cases C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030; C-583/13
P Deutsche Bahn and Others v. Commission EU:C:2015:404.
37
See Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2015:694,
passim and para. 170. The five grounds that should be upheld, according to AG Wahl, were the
38
GC’s error of law when finding that the statement of reasons of the Commission decision was
adequate, the GC’s erroneous interpretation of necessary information, the CG’s error of law
when finding that the Commission was entitled to request information in a specific format,
the GC’s inadequate reasoning as regards vagueness of certain questions in the contested de-
cision, and the GC’s erroneous interpretation of the right not to incriminate oneself.
See Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2015:694,
para. 68.
39
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requesting information which is not necessary within the meaning of Arti-
cle 18(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 is unlawful (in whole or in part) and, as such,
ought to be annulled by the EU Courts.’40
Indeed, the requirement that information requested must be necessary for
investigations may be understood as limiting the scope of information the
Commission may ask to be provided. Even though the Commission itself, as a
starting point, defines what information is necessary for its investigations, it
does not enjoy unlimited discretion in this matter.41 According to the case law
of the EU Courts, the necessity for information should be evaluated in relation
to the purpose stated in the request, a central issue being whether the infringe-
ments the Commission aims to investigate are defined sufficiently clearly.42
Information requests which are not supported by a description of the purpose
of the request may be legitimately questioned by undertakings as not complying
with Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003.
In the Cement case, AG Wahl noted that the GC seemed to erroneously ac-
cept that any connection between information requested and a presumed in-
fringement is enough to fulfil the requirement concerning necessary informa-
tion. Even though the meaning of necessity is not in this context literal, in the
sense of conditio sine qua non, the test now applied by the GC was, according to
Wahl, too permissive.43 Wahl highlighted that an essential question should be
whether information could reasonably be expected to be helpful to the Commis-
sion, and criticised the fact that the relevance of that aspect had been dismissed
by the GC.44 The latter had stated, truly quite surprisingly when observed from
the perspective of the wording of Regulation 1/2003, that a possible lack of
usefulness of the information sought would in any event not affect the lawful-
ness of the contested decision.45
Wahl also discussed the issue of information already previously requested
and submitted, and information in the public domain, with a view to the concept
of necessary information, noting that the necessity criterion might not be ful-
Ibid., para. 86.40
See Case 155/79 AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission EU:C:1982:157, para. 17. See also, e.g.,
Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2015:694,
paras. 70-81.
41
See, e.g., notes 22-24 supra.42
See Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2015:694,
paras. 71-72, 83-85.
43
See ibid., para. 85. See also Joined Cases T-458/09 and T-171/10 Slovak Telekom v. Commission
EU:T:2012:145, paras. 40-60.
44
See Case T-302/11 HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:T:2014:128, paras. 54-58.45
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filled when (new) requests for such information are made.46 Evidently, even
the proportionality of such requests is questionable.
4.3 Contributions and Clarifications in the Judgments
4.3.1 Comparability of Inspection Decisions and Information
Request Decisions from the Perspective of Judicial Review
Before looking into more substance-centred contributions
visible in the Cement Judgments, it should be noted that the judgments also
reveal matters relating to comparability of inspection and information request
decisions and cases on reviewing them. As a starting point, the legal require-
ments for the Commission’s information request decisions and for decisions
ordering inspections (Art. 20 of Regulation 1/2003) are of a similar nature. This
is discussed in the Cement case by AG Wahl, who, among other things, notes
the similar wording of the relevant provisions.47 Additionally, the judgments
illustrate the close relationships of information request and inspection decisions
from the point of view of judicial review, as the CJEU discusses the obligation
to state specific reasons also citing inspection decision review cases.48 In the
case of both inspection and information request decisions, ‘a light duty to state
reasons’ may be said to apply.49
The Cement Judgments nevertheless illustrate that evaluating fact-finding
may differ in different situations. Even though the CJEU has held that the re-
quirement to state the ‘purpose of the request’ includes the obligation to indicate
the subject of the investigation and thus the alleged infringement,50 and that
the Commission must indicate as precisely as possible what is being sought
and the matters the investigation relates to, it has also, concerning review of
Commission inspection decisions, communicated that it is not essential to
precisely define the relevant markets, describe the exact legal nature of suspected
infringements or to indicate the period during which alleged infringements
were arguably committed.51
See Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement AG v. Commission
EU:C:2015:694, paras. 87-94.
46
Ibid., paras. 32-33.47
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement AG v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 19.48
See Prek/Lefèvre, ‘Competition Litigation’ 2016 (n. 5), 65-90, 83-86. See also Simonati, ‘The
Principles of Administrative Procedure’ 2011 (n. 2), 45-82, 54, 77.
49
See Case C-36/92 P SEP NV v. Commission EU:C:1994:205, para. 21; Opinion by AG Jacobs in
Case C-36/92 P SEP NV v. Commission EU:C:1993:928, paras. 22-34. See also e.g., Case
50
C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, para. 20.
See Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030, paras. 35-37.51
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Now the CJEU has underlined that these findings had related to the fact
that inspections take place at the beginning of an investigation, when no precise
information is available to the Commission.52 In the Cement case, ‘an excessively
succinct, vague and generic – and in some respects, ambiguous’ statement of
reasons in the decisions issued more than two years after the first inspections
could not be considered in accordance with the obligation to state reasons under
Article 18(3). The Commission had information which would have allowed it
to describe its suspicions of infringements in more detail.53
The CJEU does not appear to try to draw a strong formal distinction between
inspection decisions and information request decisions, but to highlight the
difference between fact-finding at the very initial stages of an investigation and
gathering information significantly later on in an investigation – and from un-
dertakings that have been subjects of inspections and have submitted informa-
tion.
4.3.2 The Fact that the Decision Type is normally used in the
Early Stages of Investigation does not in itself justify a
Vague Statement of Reasons
In particular, the Cement Judgments clarify the way in which
the requirements for a statement of reasons in information request decisions
interact with the context of a specific investigation.
The reasoning of the CJEU illustrates that even though EU law allows adap-
tation of the extent and level of detail of the statement of reasons to the situation
in which the relevant decision is made, this does not mean that the general
nature of information requests as instruments would directly justify a vague
and concise statement of reasons. Information already obtained by the Commis-
sion and the time during which it has been able to investigate the relevant in-
fringements are of relevance. If the Commission actually is able to present a
more elaborate statement of reasons, an utterly vague and concise statement
will not suffice.54
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 21, 24, 37-39.
See also Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030, para. 37.
52
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 39-40.53
See, e.g., ibid., paras. 38-39. See also Section 4.3.3 infra.54
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4.3.3 Suspected Infringements must be indicated in a Manner
which is not Excessively Vague – Issues in Judicial Review?
The Cement case illustrates the inherent difficulties relating
to deciding standards for describing the purpose of a fact-finding measure, in-
vestigation and suspected competition infringements. The Cement Judgments
form an addition to case law touching upon these themes.
In the information request decisions of the Cement case the inadequate
indications of the purpose of requests and suspected infringements were re-
markably vague. As AG Wahl aptly remarked, references to suspected infringe-
ments were all-encompassing and actually appeared to cover the ‘vast majority
of the types of agreement prohibited by Article 101 TFEU’.55 Additionally, the
geographical scope and products affected were described in a partly ambiguous
and non-exhaustive manner.56
In the inspection decision case Nexans where the statement of reasons in-
cluding a description of suspected infringements had been drafted at an early
stage of investigation and found to be acceptable regarding the aspect examined,
the geographical scope of suspected infringement, by the CJEU, the descriptions
were slightly more precise, but not entirely different from those in the Cement
case.57 In an earlier stage of Nexans, the GC found that the scope of the investi-
gation and search should have been expressly limited to products as to which
there were actual suspicions of infringements.58 From the perspective of under-
takings, the Cement Judgments constitute a welcome further development of
case law by clearly requiring more precision as regards the focus of the investi-
gation and alleged infringements, and emphasising the condition of the actual
necessity for information.
These requirements might limit the comprehensiveness of the scope of in-
formation requested and even potentially encourage the Commission to abstain
from frequent use of information request decisions within one investigation.
From the standpoint of efficient competition law enforcement, gathering infor-
mation should not, in any case, be constrained too much. Moreover, the issue
of what is emphasised in judicial review is of importance here. The Commission
may begin to focus on aspects strongly highlighted by the EU Courts but issue
decisions which are otherwise problematic.
See, e.g., Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission
EU:C:2015:694, para. 37. See also more broadly paras. 36-39.
55
See, e.g., Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2016:149, paras. 27-36.56
See Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission EU:C:2014:2030, paras. 29-41 and 4.57
See Case T-135/09 Nexans and Nexans EU:T:2012:596.58
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The Cement Judgments imply restraints on information request decisions
especially later on in an investigation. Put simply: information request decisions
with an extensive scope of information requested, accompanied by generic
statements of reasons containing foggy, all-encompassing references to suspec-
ted infringements, are more acceptable at the very beginning of an investiga-
tion.59 One could also discern a possible problem here as regards incentives for
the Commission.
A further intriguing issue is whether a precise description of suspected in-
fringements that is nevertheless later considered unfounded or erroneous
should be seen as complying with the provisions of Regulation 1/2003 and the
legal principles relating to the position of undertakings. It may be easy also to
write detailed descriptions on the purposes of investigations and suspected in-
fringements in order to gather information, if it is irrelevant that at a later stage
several or all of the suspicions are dropped.60 The Commission enjoys a broad
discretion as regards its investigative efforts and is able to prioritise its work
and decide on the investigation lines it follows.61 Additionally, at the fact-finding
stage, details of an investigation are mainly secret.62
Nevertheless, the requirement to indicate the aim of the investigation and
suspected infringements cannot be seen as a mere formal requirement which
would allow requesting or searching for any information as long as the indication
of the purpose has, at the time of gathering information, been written in a
manner which suits a fact-finding exercise. The issue of necessity of information
or search has an interface with the prohibition on arbitrary and disproportionate
measures by public authorities. If not the concept of necessity in itself, this
prohibition at least bans highly speculative information requests and searches
under Articles 18 and 20 of Regulation 1/2003. The Commission must have
reasonable grounds for suspecting a competition infringement and for adopting
an information gathering decision (even though those grounds need not be
communicated to undertakings in their entirety and are not necessarily examined
by the EU Courts).63
See also Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission
EU:C:2015:694, para. 50.
59
As regards describing the scope of the investigation vaguely and thus broadening the scope of
what might be considered necessary information, see also ibid., paras. 53-54.
60
See Arts. 7-8 and 10 of Regulation 1/2003. See further, e.g., L. Ortiz Blanco/K. Jörgens/
M. Tierno Centella, ‘The Organization of European Commission Proceedings’, in Ortiz Blanco,
EU Competition Procedure 2013 (n. 5), 167-221, 199-200.
61
See also, e.g., T-135/09 Nexans and Nexans EU:T:2012:596, para. 69. See further critical discus-
sion by Prek/Lefèvre, ‘Competition Litigation’ 2016 (n. 5), 65-90, 82-89.
62
See Opinion by AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P HeidelbergCement v. Commission EU:C:2015:694,
paras. 23-24 and 73-79. See further Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères EU:C:2002:603, paras. 27,
63
55, 70, 99, and the GC in Case T-296/11 Cementos Portland Valderrivas v. Commission
EU:T:2014:121, paras. 40-56. See also Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans v. Commission
EU:C:2014:2030, para. 34. See, however, as regards the threshold for investigating underlying
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Furthermore, the CJEU has underlined that the duty to indicate infringe-
ments investigated is relevant for the possibility of undertakings to evaluate
their obligation to cooperate and to exercise their rights of defence.64
All this signifies that, in the context of decisions under Articles 18 and 20,
descriptions of suspected infringements should be relatively well-thought
through and justified. However, evaluation difficulties will probably always
arise from the fact that the same suspicions may seem justified at one stage
and unjustified at another stage of an investigation – and from the fact that
concepts such as ‘justified suspicion’ are themselves tricky as a yardstick.
It is evident that setting judicial standards for reviewing the Commission’s
ideas on possible competition infringements and information or search necessary for
investigating them remains challenging.65
4.4 The Significance and Implications of the Judgments in
Practice
One aspect of the de facto implications of the Cement Judg-
ments is the approach of the Commission to the relevance of the judgments.
Earlier, when the GC issued its judgments upholding the relevant Commission
information request decisions, the Commission came forward with a statement
welcoming the judgments:
‘These judgments are important because they confirm the scope of the
Commission's powers to investigate suspected antitrust infringements. In
particular, the Court confirmed that it is for the Commission to decide what
information it considers necessary to request from companies when investi-
gating potential anticompetitive practices, as long as the Commission can rea-
sonably expect that the information would help it to determine whether the al-
leged infringement took place.’66
Notably, after the CJEU judgments, a spokesperson for the Commission
reportedly commented that ‘The implications of the judgments are likely to be
facts or for finding that the underlying facts do not justify presented suspicion, Joined Cases
97/87 to 99/87 Dow Chemical EU:C:1989:380, paras. 52-53, and the GC in Case T-135/09
Nexans and Nexans EU:T:2012:596, para. 72. As to discussion, see Prek/Lefe ̀vre, ‘Competition
Litigation’ 2016 (n. 5), 65-90, 86-89.
See, e.g., note 19 supra.64
See also Section 4.2 supra.65
Commission Memo MEMO/14/192 ‘Antitrust: Commission welcomes General Court judgments
in cement cartel case confirming its investigatory powers’, Brussels, 14 March 2014.
66
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confined to the present case, as the ECJ pronounced itself only on the issue of
reasoning.’67
Commentators have disagreed with the reported Commission comment
and considered the Cement Judgments important, potentially contributing to
better clarity and specificity of Commission information gathering decisions,
as well as conceivably limiting the scope of information requests.68
Indeed, it is perceivable that the judgments, and even the comprehensive
AG Opinions, are of notable significance as regards the appropriateness of
Commission information request decisions and, more broadly, any fact-finding
decisions. One would expect the Cement Judgments to encourage the Commis-
sion to consider closely what information should be requested (or searched),
with what kind of reasoning, and at what point information request decisions
would optimally be adopted. A central question is whether the Commission is
now actively trying to develop its decisions or whether the way to more elaborate
fact-finding decisions is through learning from further strict judicial review. It
is possible that the GC will now pay particular attention to appropriately review-
ing relevant Commission measures.
See, e.g., F. Carloni/G. Da Costa, ‘Judgments in the Cement Case: Requirement for Greater
Clarity, Specificity, and Justification of Information Requests from the Commission’, Journal
67
of European Competition Law & Practice, 10.1093/jeclap/lpw032, advance access 29 April 2016;
C. Riis-Madsen/C. Jacquot, ‘The European Commission’s Investigative Powers Curtailed by
the EU Court’, O’Melveny Publications (14 March 2016), www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-
publications/alerts/the-european-commissions-investigative-powers-curtailed-by-the-eu-court/
(accessed 11 June 2016).
See, e.g., Carloni/G. Da Costa, ‘Judgments in the Cement Case’ 2016 (n. 67); A. Lamadrid,
‘The ECJ annuls the General Court’s Judgments and the Commission’s decisions in the cement
68
case (on the limits of information requests)’,Chillin’ Competition (10 March 2016), chillingcom-
petition.com/2016/03/10/the-ecj-annuls-the-general-courts-judgments-and-the-commissions-
decisions-in-the-cement-case-on-the-limits-of-information-requests/ (accessed 11 June 2016).
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